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Abstract 
Worldwide data on terrorist incidents between 1968 and 2004 gathered by the RAND 
corporation and the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT) were assessed for patterns and trends in morbidity/mortality.  Adjusted data analyzed 
involve a total of 19,828 events, 7,401 “adverse” events (each causing ≥1 victim), and 86,568 
“casualties” (injuries) of which 25,408 were fatal.  Most terror-related adverse events, casualties 
and deaths involved bombs and guns.  Weapon-specific patterns and terror-related risk levels in 
Israel (IS) have differed markedly from those of all other regions combined (OR).  IS had a fatal 
fraction of casualties about half that of OR, but has experienced relatively constant lifetime 
terror-related casualty risks on the order of 0.5%—a level 2 to 3 orders of magnitude more than 
those experienced in OR that increased ~100-fold over the same period.  Individual event fatality 
has increased steadily, the median increasing from 14 to 50%.  Lorenz curves obtained indicate 
substantial dispersion among victim/event rates: about half of all victims were caused by the top 
2.5% (or 10%) of harm-ranked events in OR (or IS).  Extreme values of victim/event rates were 
approximated fairly well by generalized Pareto models (typically used to fit to data on forest 
fires, sea levels, earthquakes, etc.).  These results were in turn used to forecast maximum OR- 
and IS-specific victims/event rates through 2080, illustrating empirically based methods that 
could be applied to improve strategies to assess, prevent and manage terror-related risks and 
consequences. 
 
 
Key words:  Extreme value, homeland security, modeling, generalized Pareto 
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Introduction 
 Over the last four decades, but particularly since events on September 11, 2001, data and 
interest have grown pertaining to trends and patterns in global terrorism and strategies to combat 
it (e.g., Fowler, 1981; Congleton, 2002; Cordes et al., 1984; Hoffman, 1997,1998; Smithson, 
2000a; Frey and Leuchinger, 2003).  Since 2001, the RAND corporation and the Oklahoma City 
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) have worked to prepare an 
online database of terrorism incidents to help researchers, analysts, and others working to 
prevent terrorism (Ellis, 2004).  The resulting MIPT Terrorism Database System now provides 
public access to comprehensive information and intelligence on terrorism, including two RAND 
databases containing date, location and victim-rate data for specific events:  the RAND 
Terrorism Chronology Database, and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database (MIPT, 
2004a).  The Chronology Database records international terrorist incidents that occurred between 
1968 and 1997, while the Incident Database records domestic as well as international terrorist 
incidents that occurred from 1998 to the present (MIPT, 2004b).  Input to these databases is 
stated as being obtained from open source materials (e.g., newspapers) after review to verify 
accuracy (MIPT, 2004c).  
 The two RAND-MIPT data sets pertaining to terrorist incidents from 1968 to the present 
(referred to hereafter jointly as RAND-MIPT data) reflect a definition of terrorism not by 
perpetrator identity, but rather by whether acts reflect “violence calculated to create an 
atmosphere of fear and alarm” to coerce others into action or inaction not otherwise undertaken, 
generally directed against civilian targets, with motives that are political expressed through 
actions generally carried out in a way that achieves maximum publicity (MIPT, 2004b).  This 
definition of terrorism is similar to that used by others studying terrorism, e.g. Frey and 
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Leuchinger (2003) define terrorists as “perpetrators [who] (i) use force on civilians; (ii) act in an 
unofficial capacity ... in particular, not [as] part of the national army and ... not wear[ing] any 
national uniform; (iii) want to achieve political goals; (iv) aim to have far-reaching effects 
beyond the immediate victims, particularly through the media.” 
 RAND-MIPT data contain publicly accessible data that may be used, certainly as a starting 
point, to characterize historical patterns and possible trends concerning, among other things, 
mortality and morbidity risks imposed by terrorism.  However, these data are provided with the 
caveat that they are “intended only to aid those seeking to better comprehend terrorism and 
should not be used as a tool for any sort of analysis, predictive or otherwise” (MIPT, 2004c).  
This caveat suggests that patterns or trends that may be evident in the data may be spurious, or 
artifacts of data collection methods used, etc.  The present study was undertaken to assess this 
possibility, by examining the data for patterns and trends in a way that accounts for statistical 
error as well as the major discontinuity starting in 1998 in the definition used for included 
events. 
 Primary endpoints examined were rates of mortality and morbidity due to terrorist events 
over time and per event, and how these rates may vary by geographic region, target, and weapon 
used.   Extreme-value distributions of victims/event were also examined.  If extreme values of a 
phenomenon arise from independent stochastic variation acting on a homogeneous underlying 
mechanism, their statistical distribution should be a member of a generalized extreme value 
family of distributions readily characterized by statistical methods (Coles and Pericchi, 2003).  
This type of analysis is often done on data pertaining to temperature, wind speed, rainfall, sea 
and river levels, wave heights, material breaking strength, earthquakes, etc.  Irregularities or 
discontinuities in extreme-value distributions for data on victims/event exhibited in meaningful 
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subsets of the data analyzed would indicate underlying non-homogeneities due not likely to 
chance, but rather to mixed underlying mechanisms, sampling bias, effects of unidentified 
covariates, data inconsistencies, or other factors.  Methods described below were used along 
these lines to assess RAND-MIPT data, after first adjusting (as described below) a single but 
quite large, erroneous casualty estimate that appears in those data for the 1995 Tokyo subway 
attack involving sarin gas.  Apparent trends and patterns revealed by this analysis are 
summarized in Results, followed by a discussion of potential key limitations and implications. 
 Analyses reported here were done using RAND-MIPT web-accessible data described (at the 
time this report was prepared) as being last updated on November 24, 2004 (MIPT, 2004a, 
2004c).  Historical data made available from this source are subject to modification and are 
updated regularly with new information, which may affect results of any future study done along 
the lines of that reported here. 
 
Methods 
 As of mid-December, 2004, RAND-MIPT data were divided into two different datasets: 
incidents collected between 1968 and 1997 (the “RAND Terrorism Chronology”) only account 
for international terrorism (incidents in which the perpetrators cross national boundaries strike 
targets, select domestic targets with a foreign state association or create an international incident 
by attacking airline passengers or equipment, where as data from 1998 to the present include 
domestic terrorism incidents (perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target) as 
well as international incidents (MIPT, 2004b). 
 About 5.5% of all casualties (i.e., injuries + deaths) included in RAND-MIPT data reflect 
5,000 injuries plus 12 deaths attributed by the database to the Aum Shinrikyo attack involving 
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release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995.  The source of this estimate 
is listed as being “Chronology Data” logged on April 3, 1995, just two weeks after the event.  
However, it was later established that the vast majority (well over 70%) of the >5,500 patients 
seen in Tokyo clinics for symptoms associated with coordinated releases of a total of ~4.7 liters 
of sarin on five subway cars suffered no real physical symptoms at all, and that the nearly all 
remaining patients seen suffered only mild myosis and/or headache lasting <24 h, except for 17 
critically injured patients (12 of whom later died), 37 severely injured patients, and a number of 
moderately injured patients who were non-ambulatory with non-mild physical symptoms, 107 of 
the latter having been treated at St. Luke’s Hospital that “bore the brunt of the disaster” 
(Smithson, 2000b).  Additional stress-related psychological symptoms were reported after the 
event (Smithson, 2000b).  For the purpose of the present study, total injuries associated with this 
incident were taken to comprise all (54) of those severely and critically injured, plus all of those 
injured moderately as defined above, the latter number here estimated to be 180.  So corrected to 
adjust for injuries associated with the 1995 Tokyo subway incident, the data analyzed shall be 
referred to as RAND-MIPT-TC data. 
 RAND-MIPT-TC data were divided into 5-y periods starting in 1968-1972; event, death and 
casualty data for 2005-2007 during the final period were estimated by multiplying corresponding 
data obtained for 2003-2004 by the ratio (5 years)/(2 years).  Database variables addressed were:  
time period, casualties (injuries + deaths), deaths, “adverse” events (AEs, meaning terrorist 
events that caused one or more casualties), world region (Africa, East Central Asia, Eastern 
Europe, Israel, Latin America, Near East [excluding Israel and the Occupied Territories], North 
America, the Occupied Territories, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceana, and Western 
Europe), weapon type (Biological, Bomb, Chemical, Fire, Guns, Remote-controlled Bomb, 
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Bladed Weapons such as knives, and Other), and target (Airport & Airlines, Business, 
Diplomatic, Government, Military, Police, Private Citizens/Property, Religious Figures & 
Institutions, Transportation, and Other), where “Other” denotes unknown, unavailable, 
unidentified, or otherwise not included in the database.  Corresponding world-region population 
data were obtained from an international population database (USBC, 2004). 
 The following terms and notation are used:  “event” = terrorism “incident”,  Fadv = fraction 
of events that caused casualties, Ffat = “fatal fraction” of adverse-event-induced casualties (i.e., 
fraction of casualties representing deaths), and X0 (= –a/b) = the abscissa intercept of a linear fit 
Y = a + bX conditional Y = 0.  The fraction Ffat is referred to as an “unweighted” average when 
calculated as Ffat = k–1 S mi /ci , and as a “casualty-weighted” average when calculated instead as 
Ffat = S mi /S ci  =  S wi (mi /ci)/S wi  with weights wi = ci, where mi = deaths and ci =  casualties 
per ith adverse event AEi , and summation (S) is over all k corresponding AEi ,  i = 1,...,k within a 
specific period or region.  The weighted mean fraction Ffat is thus synonymous with the ratio of 
total deaths to total casualties within one or more specified categories. 
 Significance of differences in means, of linear trends, of differences among linear-
regression slopes and intercepts, of outlying data, and of outliers among data fit by linear 
regression were assessed, respectively, by 2-tail t-test, by 2-tail t-test for non-zero linear 
regression slope, by analysis of covariance (ANOCOVAR), by 2-tail F-test for reduced variance, 
and by F-test for reduced goodness of linear fit (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989).  In cases of 
unequal variance assessed by 2-tail F-test using a critical value of a = 0..05, significance of a 
difference in means was assessed using Welch's approximate 2-tail t-test (Kendall and Stuart, 
1979).  P-values obtained for related sets of multiple tests (e.g., region-specific regression slopes 
for events plotted against period) were transformed to corresponding adjusted values (padj) to 
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account for multiple independent tests using Hommel’s Bonferroni-type adjustment (Wright, 
1992).  Significance of the difference between empirical distributions for two samples each of 
size ≥100 was assessed using Smirnov’s approximate Kolmogorov 2-sample test (Kim, 1969). 
 The relative value of focusing preventive efforts on extreme events that yield very many 
victims requires knowledge of the extent to which such extreme events may contribute 
disproportionately to the total number of victims.  The Lorenz curve, and corresponding Gini 
coefficient (G) of disparity are typically used to characterize income and resource inequality in 
econometric and ecologic studies.  A Lorenz curve C plots the inverse cumulative relative 
frequency function for n ordered relative magnitudes, fi = x(i)/Sxi, i=1,...,n, and so plots (vs. i/n) 
the cumulative relative contribution of x(i) toward the n-sample mean value of x, for which an 
unbiased sample estimate of the corresponding inequality index G is given by [n/(n–1)][1–
(AC / 2)] where AC  is the area beneath C (Dagum, 1980; Damgaard and Weiner, 2000).  These 
measures were used to characterize the relative contribution of extreme events toward total 
deaths and total casualties due to terrorism over the entire study period. 
 If generated by a homogeneous independent stochastic process, extreme values of a rate (X) 
of victims (deaths or casualties) per event are expected to have a generalized extreme value 
(GEV) distribution, such that the corresponding likelihood of exceedance above a selected 
threshold u will follow a generalized Pareto (GP) distribution, 
 Prob(X > x)    =    fu {1 + e[(x–u)/s]}–1/e  
† 
e Æ0æ Æ æ   fu exp[–(x–u)/s]    (1) 
where fu = Prob(X > u); s and e are the GP-model scale and shape parameters, respectively; and a 
further Poisson assumption implies that the level xm exceeded on average once every m events or 
observations is just xm|{Prob(X > xm) = 1 – P0}, where P0 = Prob(zero exceedances) ª the mean 
threshold-exceedance rate of l = 1/m (Coles, 2001; Coles and Pericchi, 2003).  A time-
  9 
 
dependent GP model was also applied in which the scale parameter s in Eq. (1) was re-expressed 
as a linear function a + b t of time t (Coles, 2001), where t = Y–1968 for event year Y.  
Maximum likelihood estimates were obtained for GP-model parameters, together with 
corresponding profile-likelihood (as feasible, otherwise delta-method) confidence limits (CL); 
CLs on maximum likelihood estimates of return levels xm|u were calculated using the delta 
method (Coles, 2001).  Likelihood equations were modified to reflect an exact Poisson 
assumption that P0 = exp(–l).  Each GP fit included a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis 
that e = 0, and significance value pe=0 of the corresponding deviance statistic for that test (Coles, 
2001).  GP fits were obtained conditional on e = 0 in each case the corresponding initial fit 
yielded pe=0 > 0.01. 
 Data analysis and model fitting was done using Mathematica® 5.0 (Wolfram Research, 
Champaign, IL) and related computer software (Wolfram, 1999; Bogen, 2004). 
 
Results 
 Weapons and targets.  Occurrence rates and impacts on morbidity and mortality of all 
25,303 events included in the database studied are summarized by period in Table 1, by weapon 
type for all regions combined in Table 2, and by weapon type for Israel in Table 3.  In all regions 
combined over the entire period studied, ~80% of adverse events and related casualties, and 
~70% of related deaths involved bombs and guns (Table 2).  While bombs caused about 5 times 
as many casualties and twice as many deaths as did guns, adverse events involving guns have on 
average been about ~2.5 times more lethal those involving bombs (Table 2).  The fatal fraction 
(Ffat) of all casualties from adverse events was greatest (nearly 80%) for the “other” weapons 
category (Table 2), which for example includes all terror-related 3,056 deaths on Sept. 11, 2001, 
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in New York City, in Washington D.C. and on hijacked American Airlines Flight 77, which had 
a combined 100% fatality rate. 
 Weapon-specific morbidity and mortality rates from events in Israel (Table 3) differ 
substantially from those in all other regions combined.  In Israel from 1968-2004, bombs and 
guns were involved in only ~75% of adverse events, but accounted for >90% of related 
casualties and ~86% of related deaths (Table 3).  In Israel during this period, bombs caused 
about 10 times as many casualties and 8 times as many deaths as did guns (i.e., the bomb-to-gun 
potency ratio in Israel has been about twice that of all other regions combined); and while each 
adverse event involving guns was on average about twice as lethal as those involving bombs, 
casualty-weighted fatal fraction (Ffat) of all casualties by guns and that by bombs were nearly 
equal (Table 3).  The latter fraction for gun-related events in Israel (Ffat = 17.5%) is 
approximately one third the size of the corresponding fraction (51.2%) for all other regions 
combined (Tables 2-3).  The percent of total terrorism-induced deaths due to bombs from 1968-
2004 in Israel vs. all other regions combined was 77.1% vs. 48.1%, whereas this comparison for 
guns is 9.3% vs. 22.9%.  The Israeli figure for bombs is the greater than that of any other region 
(the Near East coming in second at 71.0%, and North America last at 10.3%).  Only North 
America has experienced a percent of gun-induced terrorism-related deaths (1.2%) smaller than 
that of Israel.   
 A few period-specific rates by weapon and target clearly changed starting in 1998, likely 
reflecting the inclusion of domestic events in the database starting in 1998.  For example, period-
specific fractions of events prior to 1998 vs. after 1997, respectively, were for events involving:  
guns <40 vs. >40%, unspecified weapons >13% vs. <13%, private citizens/property <9% vs. 
>22%, government targets <3% vs. >20%, and police targets <2% vs. >6%.  Some significant 
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overall trends were detected, however.  Period-specific fractions of events over 5-y periods 
starting in 1968 through 1997 or through 2007, had the following statistically significant trends:  
those involving bombs fell from 57% to ~40% through 1997 (R2 = 0.67, p = 0.046) and through 
2007 (R2 = 0.58, p = 0.029); those involving diplomatic targets fell from 40% to >10% through 
1997 (R2 = 0.96, p = 0.000024) and to <2% through 2007 (R2 = 0.95, p = 0.00092); and those 
involving airport/airline targets fell from 14% to ~2% through 1997 (R2 = 0.96, p = 0.000020) 
and to <0.5% through 2007 (R2 = 0.96, p = 0.00062).  Similarly significant temporal trends were 
not observed for corresponding attributable fractions of total casualties or deaths. 
 
 Occurrence of total vs. adverse events. No significant trend was found in the occurrence rate 
of international events worldwide over six 5-y periods (a total of 30 years) from 1968-97 
(p = 0.16), which corresponds to an average (±1 SEM) rate of 274 ± 31.8 events/y.  The 
corresponding mean post-1997 rate has been 1707 ± 118 events/y—a rate significantly (6.2-fold) 
greater than the pre-1998 rate (p = 2 ¥ 10-6), clearly reflecting the post-1997 inclusion of 
domestic terrorism events in the MIPT database.  There was a significant upward temporal linear 
trend in adverse event (AE) occurrence worldwide (Figure 1A), though not at a regional level 
(padj > 0.05).  AE occurrence after 1997 has been approximately 2- and 4.7-fold greater than 
those prior to 1998 in Israel and in all other regions combined, respectively, due to post-1997 
inclusion of domestic events in RAND-MIPT data.  Using these approximations, corresponding 
cumulative AEs by year y were found to be well approximated by linear-quadratic functions:  
AIS(y) = 11.478(±0.646)Y + 0.24515(±0.02284)Y2 (Israel, R2 = 0.992) and AOR(y) = 
204.055(±12.272)Y + 6.3435(±0.4341)Y2 (all other regions, R2 = 0.994), with Y = y–1968, 
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coefficient estimates shown ±1 SE, and each R2 calculated as the complement of the 
corresponding residual-to-total sum-of-squares ratio. 
 Significant upward temporal trends have occurred also in the worldwide “adverse” fraction 
(Fadv) of period-specific terrorist events in Africa, Latin America, the Near East (excluding Israel 
and the Occupied Territories), and South Asia taken as a “rising” group (Figure 1B).  However, 
no trend is evident in Fadv for Israel, or for all other regions combined as a “static” group (Figure 
1B).  Over all periods studied, Israel experienced the highest mean value of Fadv (0.60), about 
twice that of the “static” regional group, while over this time span the “rising” group has 
experienced Fadv levels that increased from about that of the “static” group to about that of Israel 
(Figure 1B).   
 
 Victim, victims/event and fatality rates. Worldwide casualties and deaths per period due to 
terrorism have risen fairly steadily over the entire time span studied, with pre-1998 levels (which 
did not include domestic events), having been about 4-fold less than post-1997 levels (which did; 
Figure 1C).  Corresponding period-specific values of the ratio of total victims to total events 
show similarly increasing trends, which were not clearly affected by post-1997 inclusion of 
domestic events (Figure 1D). 
 Upward temporal trends are also evident in the ratios of casualties and of deaths to total 
adverse events (AE) (Figure 2A).  While casualty-weighted mean values of Ffat by period show 
no temporal trend in or outside of Israel, unweighted values of Ffat (i.e., death-to-casualty ratios 
for each event, averaged within each period) have increased steadily over time in all regions 
combined excluding Israel (p = 0.011, Figure 2B).  Integrating over all time periods, the 
relatively high Ffat ratio for North America compared to all other regions (Figure 2C) is due to 
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the 100% fatality rate for all casualties inflicted on September 1, 2001.  The Ffat ratio for Israel is 
(just) significantly smaller than those of all other regions excluding North America (p = 0.05). 
 No single event explains Israel’s relatively low casualty-weighted mean Ffat ratio 
(Figure 2B-C).  Although, Fadv generally has been higher for Israel than for any other region 
examined (Figure 1B), corresponding period-specific deaths/event for Israel vs. other regions 
combined show (by ANOCOVAR) no significant difference in either slope (p = 0.32) or 
intercept (p = 0.090) of linear trend.  The latter trend was significantly positive for the other 
combined regions (padj = 0.0016), increasing from approximately 0.4 to 1.6 deaths/event from the 
first to the last time period examined.  Israel’s casualty-weighted mean Ffat ratio has remained 
about half that of other regions combined (Figure 2B-C). 
 Period-specific worldwide Ffat distributions clearly have shifted to the right over time, 
increasingly including more extreme values (Figure 3).  For example, from 1968-72 to 2003-
2004, the median value of Ffat increased 0.14 to 0.50, while the percentage of events in which 
Ffat = 0 decreased from 41% to 27% (Figure 8). During the same period in Israel, Ffat values for 
adverse events involving bombs have been lower, and Ffat values for adverse events involving 
guns have been remarkably lower, than corresponding Ffat values experienced in all other regions 
combined, regardless of the casualties/AE rate (Figure 4A).  Likewise, the percent of gun-related 
lethal events has been substantially lower in Israel compared to other combined regions, 
regardless of the number of deaths per lethal event (Figure 4B). 
 
 Per capita risks of mortality and morbidity from terrorism.  Combined over all periods 
examined, events in Israel have tended to involve greater numbers of victims per event than have 
events that occurred in all other regions combined (Figure 5).  During this interval, while the 
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Israeli population comprised an average of 0.093% of the population of all other regions 
combined, RAND-MIPT-TC data indicate that Israel hosted 4.0% of all terrorist events, 5.3% of 
all terrorism-related deaths, and 9.7% of all terrorism-related casualties (i.e., about 40, 60 and 
100 times the corresponding rates expected based solely on relative population). 
 Israel similarly has experienced far greater per capita lifetime (70-year) equivalent risks of 
mortality (Rfat) and morbidity (Rcas) due to terrorism over this period, compared to all other non-
Near-Eastern regions combined (Figure 6).  From 1968-1997 (prior to inclusion of domestic 
events in the data analyzed), Rcas and Rfat had mean values of 2,400 per million (~0.2%) and 410 
per million (~0.04%), respectively—values 190- and 150-fold greater, respectively, than 
corresponding risks experienced during the same period in all other non-Near-Eastern regions 
combined.  Corresponding levels of per capita risk experienced in the Near East outside of Israel 
and the Occupied Territories over all periods have ranged between levels experienced in Israel 
and those experienced in non-Near-Eastern regions, while rates experienced in the Occupied 
Territories remained at Near-Eastern levels from 1968-92 but then jumped approximately to 
Israeli levels thereafter (Figure 6). 
 
 Extreme values of victims/event.  Lorenz curves for the cumulative fraction of victims of 
terrorist events during 1968-2004 (Figure 7) indicate substantial heterogeneity in victim/event 
rates in Israel (G = 0.600 for deaths, 0.689 for casualties), and even more so in all other regions 
combined (G = 0.717 for deaths, 0.796 for casualties).  The Lorenz curves for each region also 
have quite different upper-right patterns, indicating very different contributions to victim totals 
by extreme events that caused the greatest numbers of victims (Figure 7).  For example, from 
these curves it is evident that during this period that the top 10% of events in Israel ranked by 
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harmfulness caused about half of all victims there, whereas about half of all victims were caused 
by the top 2.5% of all similarly ranked events in all other regions combined. 
 Absent any clear indication of a pre-1998 vs. post-1997 discontinuity (e.g., due to post-1997 
inclusion of domestic terrorist events) in data on victims/event, on victims per adverse event, or 
on the fatal fraction of adverse events (Figures 1B, 1D, 2A-B), events during 1968-2004 that 
yielded ≥1 victim (casualty or death) were pooled for the purpose of extreme-value analysis.  
Generalized Pareto (GP) models were found to be reasonably good models of extreme-value 
patterns exhibited in Israeli and Other-Region data on casualties/AE, and for Other-Region data 
on deaths per lethal event (Figure 8, left plots).  Corresponding model parameter estimates and 
confidence limits are listed in Table 4 (rows 1, 3, 4 and 6).  In view of significant temporal trends 
in worldwide victims/event data (Figure 1D), fits using a GP-trend model were made to non-
Israeli per event data on deaths and on casualties; however, neither fit included a trend (b) 
parameter estimate significantly different from zero (Table 4, rows 2 and 5). 
 The fits obtained for Israeli vs. combined non-Israeli regions clearly differ markedly.  In 
view of similarly marked differences in the fatality and relative frequency of gun- vs. bomb-
related adverse or fatal incidents in Israel vs. all other regions combined (Figure 6), additional 
weapon-specific GP-model fits were obtained shown in Figure 8 (right plots), for which 
corresponding parameter estimates and confidence limits are listed in Table 4 (rows 7-14).  
These additional fits similarly characterize the extreme-value data on victims/event reasonably 
well, with shape parameter (e) values estimated to be either ~0 (notably, for all fits involving 
gun- or bomb-related deaths) or significantly <0 (most notably for fits involving gun- or bomb-
related casualties in Israel), and in no case significantly >0.  The weapon-specific fits obtained 
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for Israeli vs. combined non-Israeli regions clearly differ markedly for data on bomb-related 
deaths and casualties and on gun-related casualties. 
 Estimated cumulative AE-occurrence functions AIS(y) and AOR(y) given above (Occurrence 
of total vs. adverse events) were used to re-scale region-specific abscissa values of the GP-model 
fits shown in Figure 8 (left), resulting in the re-scaled fits (and 95% CL) shown in Figure 9 that 
are extrapolated to the year 2080 and compared to corresponding empirical data through 2004.  
These fits represent region-specific forecasts of the maximum value MV(y) of victims/AE 
expected by the indicated year y, arising from terror-related events involving all (i.e., only those) 
weapons already represented in RAND-MIPT data through 2004.  For example,  the top plot in 
Figure 9 indicates that the likelihood of a terror-related event that involves one of these weapons 
causing ~10,000 casualties somewhere outside Israel becomes significant (2-tail p > 0.05) by 
around the year 2025.  Note the forecasts shown were not fit to the corresponding annual-
summary data subsets also plotted, but rather are temporal projections of GP-model fits from 
Figure 8 (left) that were made to time-independent, victim-number data for (in Israel) hundreds 
or (in all other regions combined) thousands of individual adverse events.  Expected values of 
the maximum mortality/AE rate exceed those of the maximum rate of total casualties/AE after 
the year ~2020, but this apparent inconsistency may be due to greater uncertainty in forecasts of 
the latter measure compared to the former. 
 An important aspect of each forecast in Figure 9 involves the steadily decreasing value of its 
expected excess relative magnitude ERM(y, dy) = {[MV(y)/MV(y–dy)]–1}100% after a lag 
period of dy years relative to any current year y.  Setting dy = 10 years, for example, ERM(y, 10) 
for worldwide deaths/AE outside Israel decreases from about 100% in 1990, to 60% in 2000, to 
20% in 2060, whereas ERM(y, 10) for worldwide casualties/AE outside Israel decreases from 
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about 50% in 1990, to 30% in 2000, to 10% in 2045.  A similar decreasing ERM(y, 10) pattern 
pertains to Israel.  The forecasts quantify an expectation of increasing difficulty faced by 
terrorists who seek to use the current array of weapons to cause harm that is substantially larger 
in relative magnitude than the most harmful event experienced over a specified previous period 
of time. 
 
Discussion 
 A number of statistically significant temporal trends were identified in RAND-MIPT-TC 
data on international terrorist events from 1968-1997, including trends for adverse events, the 
adverse fraction of all events, total victims, victims/event, and unweighted fatal fraction of 
adverse events.  Most of these significant trends pertain also to the larger period 1968-2004, 
which includes the post-1997 period during which domestic events were included in the data 
analyzed.  An increased lethality trend, observed in many previous studies on terrorism (Frey and 
Leuchinger, 2003), has been attributed to the increasing proportion of fundamentalist religion-
based terrorist groups seeking mass casualties of innocent people to make their cause widely 
known, in contrast to leftist/nationalist terrorists who prefer to persuade hearts and minds toward 
revolution by avoiding the death or injury of people not directly connected with an existing 
political and economic regime (Hoffman 1997, 1998; Juergensmeyer, 1997). 
 The data analyzed clearly indicate a persistent, relatively very high mortality and morbidity 
burden faced by Israel from terrorism during 1968-2004, compared to all other regions 
combined.  Lifetime (70-year) equivalent risks of casualty estimated in this study to be between 
10-3 and 10-2, and corresponding mortality risks between 10-4 and 10-3, approach or exceed 
corresponding occupational hazard levels for industrial workers in economically advanced 
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nations.  In contrast, corresponding lifetime casualty risks between 10-6 and 10-4 and mortality 
risks between 10-6 and 2 ¥ 10-5 experienced in non-Near-Eastern regions are risk levels that, in a 
public health context, are typically considered de minimis.  RAND-MIPT-TC data do, however, 
exhibit the significant upward temporal trend noted in log-casualty rates for most of the world, 
that have increased by about two orders of magnitude over 40 years (Figure 6).  Any public 
health significance of this trend can only be assessed in the broader context of lifetime risks of 
casualty from all forms of organized human violence, accounting for changes over time in how 
such violence has been defined and classified (e.g., as war, civil war, revolution, crime or 
“terrorism”). 
 In contrast to the relatively high risk burden faced by Israel during 1968-2004, the RAND-
MIPT-TC data also clearly indicate a persistent, relatively low fatal fraction of terrorism-related 
casualties (particularly for gun-related casualties) in Israel compared to all other regions 
combined.  Relatively low Ffat values in Israel might possibly be explained by erroneous inflation 
of casualty rates (e.g., due to greater tendency to seek medical attention for minor or non-existent 
injuries, compared to other areas worldwide), although the authors are not aware of any evidence 
supporting this hypothesis.  In contrast, a key factor likely to contribute to lower Ffat values in 
Israel compared to other regions is the very effective, integrated system of world-renowned and 
remarkably successful emergency medical research and services developed over many decades 
in Israel, in part due to its adaptive response to casualties generated by persistent terrorism there.  
In addition to its integrated delivery system, emergency medical services in Israel have benefited 
from related highly effective technologies developed in that country over the last decade, such as 
the emergency “Israeli bandage” that since 2002 has become standard equipment in many U.S. 
military and law-enforcement organizations, due to its ability to provide easily administered, 
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immediate hemorrhage control, and so prevent death from shock before other treatment is 
possible (Blackburn, 2005).  Israeli emergency medical system has increased survival among all 
(terror- and non-terror-related) severe trauma patients over time, though experience treating 
terror-related trauma there has shown these injuries to involve greater risk of death, greater 
involvement of younger victims, more serious and extensive burns, more penetrating injuries, 
greater vascular damage, greater requirement for surgery, and greater risk of very serious long-
term disability and rehabilitation than in cases unrelated to terrorism (Aharonson-Daniel et al., 
2003; Paleg and Aharonson-Daniel, 2004; Paleg et al., 2003, 2004).  While the Israeli emergency 
medical system has been shown to be increasingly effective in recent years at reducing mortality 
associated with terror-related injuries, relatively low Ffat values for Israel compared to all other 
regions combined have shown no evidence of a temporal trend over the last four decades 
(Figure 6B).  Thus, the primary factor explaining this difference must lie in the combination of a 
greater fraction of bomb- vs. gun-related casualties, together with lesser Ffat values for both 
bombs and guns, in Israel compared to all other regions combined. 
 Marked heterogeneity in event harmfulness exhibited in RAND-MIPT-TC data (Figure 7) 
clearly indicates the relative importance of extremely harmful events in contributing to victim 
totals, and so highlights the potential importance of better understanding extreme-value behavior 
in victim/event rates associated with terrorism.  Regularity in weapon-specific extreme-value 
patterns for victims/event appear to be described well by Pareto (or nearly Pareto) distributions 
(i.e., generalized Pareto distributions with shape parameters equal or nearly equal to zero) for six 
of eight region/weapon/endpoint combinations examined, and to be described reasonably well by 
generalized Pareto distributions with a substantially negative shape parameter in the cases of gun 
and bomb-related casualties in Israel (Table 4, Figure 8). 
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 The extreme-value behavior exhibited in RAND-MIPT-TC victims/event data appears to be 
consistent with patterns expected for independent occurrences of phenomena that have common 
underlying mechanisms.  Regularity in these patterns indicates that extreme variations in public 
health impacts of terrorist events worldwide are as predictable as variations in extreme values 
physical phenomena such as forest fires, rainfall, earthquakes, and the like.  The fact that GP-
model fits obtained in this study reflect shape parameters that are approximately zero or are 
negative, but not substantially positive, is quite interesting.  Just this type of constraint on 
extreme-value behavior is predicted generally for complex systems in which failure tolerances 
have been optimized to limit predictable losses conditional on resource constraints and on 
specified levels of risk aversion.  Complex systems that trade off resource allocations and losses 
to achieve highly optimized tolerance (HOT) using a risk-neutral strategy are robust to common 
perturbations but susceptible to rare ones, and so exhibit “fragile” extreme-loss-event 
distributions characterized by “heavy” upper-tail with likelihoods that decrease at an exponential 
(first-order) rate proportional to the value (or logarithm) of the corresponding cost or loss to the 
system (Doyle and Carlson, 2000; Zhou and Carlson, 2000; Carlson and Doyle, 2002).  HOT 
models thus exhibit just the kind of extreme-value behavior that is predicted by a Pareto model 
(i.e., a GP model with a shape parameter equal to zero).  Risk aversion expressed in systems that 
are more intolerant of high losses by constraining values (or log) of any extreme loss to increase 
only as a sub-linear function of its negative log-likelihood (Newman et al., 2002).  Systems that 
optimize resources to constrain losses in a risk averse manner thus have the same extreme-value 
behavior as GP models with a negative shape parameter.  The fact that most victims/event 
patterns for combined regions outside Israel were found to show little to no risk-averse 
characteristic (Figure 8) indicates that exploitation of terror opportunities has occurred in a 
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relatively unconstrained fashion, which in turn underscores the virtual inevitability of rare but 
very catastrophic consequences if current management strategies are not revised fundamentally. 
 Extreme value patterns found in this study of RAND-MIPT-TC data provide a fairly reliable 
empirical basis to improve strategic plans that address the risks and consequences of terrorism.  
Strategies from improved insurance mechanisms (e.g., Kunreuther, 2002) to more efficient 
counter-measure targeting could take better advantage of trend information contained in such 
data.  For example, results from the present study suggest that historical data on extreme 
victims/event rates can predict time-integrated mortality or morbidity impacts of future terrorist 
events (Figures 8 and 9).  Such predictions are consistent with a recently precipitous and 
continuing decline in excess relative magnitude of maximum harm expected per adverse terror 
event.  In other words, terrorists who use the current array of weapons to surpass previous levels 
of harm by notable relative amounts are increasingly likely to face failure and frustration.  A 
likely and ominous consequence is that terrorist interest in switching to novel weapons or 
approaches with much greater destructive power is now near its peak.   These observations 
support a renewed and urgent emphasis on worldwide development, deployment and 
coordination of effective counter-measures to prevent, detect and thwart terrorist applications of 
such novel weapons. 
 Although internal consistencies and statistical strengths of patterns and trends identified in 
this study support the conclusion that meaningful predictive interpretations of RAND-MIPT-TC 
data are currently possible, some important caveats need to be considered.  Conclusions based on 
apparent patterns and trends identified in this study clearly are conditional on the reliability of 
the data analyzed.  These data have many potential sources of bias or error that merit careful 
consideration, including (by no means exhaustively):  ambiguity or inconsistency in the 
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definition of events included vs. excluded from the database; records that may be missing or 
incomplete due to ongoing database management; data missing due to lack of records or media 
coverage; and perhaps most importantly, primary reliance on unconfirmed or potentially biased 
or potentially inaccurate reports by local news media.  Some of the patterns and trends observed 
in the present study are highly significant statistically, and thus are not likely to be artifacts due 
to isolated errors or omissions concerning small numbers of particular incident records.  
However, any pervasive systematic biases that may be present in the data studied could have 
important confounding effects that remain difficult to assess. 
 Insofar as initial news-media reports of terrorist events appear to have been the primary 
source of input to RAND-MIPT data, a key source of potential bias reflected in these data would 
be the fact that such reports may reflect inaccurate initial “guess-timates” of total injuries and/or 
deaths by local reporters, or even politically motivated distortion of true victim counts in regions 
that lack independent news media.  Corrections or refinements to initial news accounts may or 
may not appear in subsequent media reports, and if any do appear, it is not clear what if any 
systematic RAND-MIPT efforts are made to update previous records.  Evidence for non-random 
bias in RAND-MIPT data appears in Figure 3, in which each cumulative distribution shown has 
a substantial jump in relative frequency (ordinate) at corresponding Ffat (abscissa) values equal 
precisely to one third and to one half.  These jumps clearly reflect incorporation of crude initial 
estimates of the fatal fraction of casualties estimated for each event, rather than estimates based 
on confirmed hospital records or other more reliable data sources. 
 Hospital records are available in the case of Israel, which administers an Israel National 
Trauma Registry of all hospitalizations for physical trauma at nine Israeli trauma centers 
(including six level-1 centers) that are part of a tertiary care and referral system that receive the 
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majority of severe or complicated cases of physical injury throughout Israel; this Registry tracks, 
among other things, in-hospital deaths and whether each incident is related to terrorism 
(Aharonson-Daniel et al., 2003).  Between November 1, 2000, and June 30, 2003, this Registry 
recorded 1,661 terror-related injuries resulting in 100 in-hospital deaths (Paleg and Aharonson-
Daniel, 2004).  Over the same period in Israel, the RAND-MIPT data include a total of 3,353 
casualties including 2,861 injuries and 494 deaths.  One source of these discrepancies may be 
that initial casualty estimates made by Israeli (and perhaps most local) media and entered into 
RAND-MIPT data tend to overestimate actual casualties.  It is also likely that RAND-MIPT data 
include estimates of people not covered in the National Trauma Registry, who include those with 
relatively minor injuries that did not require hospitalization, deaths at the scene of events or on 
hospital arrival, and/or outpatient deaths that occurred subsequent to hospitalization (Aharonson-
Daniel et al., 2003).  In cases where accurate records of terrorism-related casualties can be 
reconstructed, systematic comparison of such information with RAND-MIPT data would help 
clarify the source of any discrepancies and perhaps also the extent to which these may pertain to 
other parts of RAND-MIPT data. 
 Despite potential data limitations, a number of patterns and trends were identified in this 
study concerning mortality and morbidity from terror-related events worldwide.  Some of these 
appear to have predictive value that may be used to improve current or planned systems for 
preventing and managing consequences of terror-related events.  Early public release and 
broader analysis of emerging data will likely facilitate the design of more effective strategies to 
manage terror-related risks.   
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Tables 
Table 1.  Summary of RAND-MITP-TC data on worldwide terrorist events, by period.a 
 
Perioda 
Events    
(e) 
Adverse 
events      
(n) 
Fadv = n/e     
(%) 
Injuriesb 
(c–m) 
Deaths 
(m) 
Ffat = m/c     
(%) 
1970 760 135 17.8 665 385 36.7 
1975 1,201 319 26.6 1,827 855 31.9 
1980 1,390 480 34.5 3,509 1,193 25.4 
1985 1,831 629 34.4 5,029 2,308 31.5 
1990 1,747 548 31.4 3,442 1,713 33.2 
1995 1,301 545 41.9 8,887 2,003 18.4 
2000a 7,948 3,030 38.1 23,642 11,154 32.1 
2005a 9,125 4,287.5 47.0 35,397.5 14,492.5 29.0 
All 40 yrs 25,303 9,973.5 39.4 82,398.5 34,103.5 29.3 
a Periods are named by midpoint of a corresponding 5-year interval, starting with 1968 – 1972 and ending with 2003 
– 2007.  Values listed for 2000 and 2005 include “domestic” terrorism events, whereas data for earlier periods do 
not.  Projected totals listed for 2003 – 2007 were estimated by linear extrapolation from data reported for 2003 – 
2004.   
b Casualties (c) here denotes the sum of the number (m) of persons killed plus the number (c–m) who are non-fatally 
injured. 
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Table 2.  Events and consequences in all regions combined, by weapon type.a 
 
Weapona 
% of all 
events,    
n/E          
(%) 
% of all 
adverse 
events,      
n/N          
(%) 
% of all 
casualties,   
c/Sc            
(%) 
% of all 
deaths,   
m/Sm            
(%) 
Unweighted 
fatal fraction, 
Ffat = 
† 
m /n           
(%) 
Weighted 
fatal fraction, 
Ffat = Sm/Sn  
(%) 
Bombs 53.4 41.8 70.1 48.1 24.2 20.1 
Guns 19.9 36.4 13.2 23.0 65.5 51.2 
Sharps 1.3 3.3 0.67 1.2 64.4 53.9 
R-Bombs 1.9 2.4 4.7 3.2 21.3 20.1 
Fire 9.8 1.6 2.7 2.7 30.5 29.4 
Chemical 0.2 0.3 0.59 0.09 32.2 4.3 
Biological 0.08 0.1 0.02 0.02 38.3 35.3 
Other 13.3 14.1 8.1 21.7 78.2 78.9 
Tot. or Ave.b 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 48.2 29.4 
a Potencies are calculated per adverse event, based on MIPT-RAND-TC data for 1968-2004, involving a total of E = 
19,828 events, N = 7,401 adverse events, 86,568 casualties and 25,408 deaths.  Sharps = knives and other bladed 
weapons, R-Bombs = remote-control bombs, Chemical = chemical agent(s), Biological = biological agent(s); 
“Other” includes unknown or unspecified.  See Table 1 for definition of other notation.  See text concerning 
temporal trends. 
b In this row, totals are listed in columns 2–5 and c-weighted average values are listed in columns 6–7.   
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Table 3.  Events and consequences in Israel, by weapon type.a 
 
Weapona 
% of all 
events,    
n/E          
(%) 
% of all 
adverse 
events,      
n/N          
(%) 
% of all 
casualties,   
c/Sc            
(%) 
% of all 
deaths,   
m/Sm            
(%) 
Unweighted 
fatal fraction, 
Ffat = 
† 
m /n           
(%) 
Weighted 
fatal fraction, 
Ffat = Sm/Sn  
(%) 
Bombs 62.8 59.7 84.8 77.1 16.8 14.5 
Guns 13.6 15.4 8.5 9.3 35.1 17.5 
Sharps 8.2 13.9 1.5 3.3 41.2 33.1 
R-Bombs 1.7 0.9 <0.1 0 0 0 
Fire 5.7 0.9 0.2 0 0 0 
Chemical 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Biological 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 8.0 9.2 5.9 10.3 49.8 33.2 
Tot. or Ave.b 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 25.8 15.9 
a Potencies are calculated per adverse event, based on MIPT-RAND data for 1968-2004, involving a total of E = 785 
events, N = 447 adverse events, 8,374 casualties and 1,334 deaths.  See Table 2, note a. 
b In this row, totals are listed in columns 2–5 and c-weighted average values are listed in columns 6–7.   
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Table 4.  Generalized Pareto model fits to MIPT-RAND-TC victims/event data.a 
 
Regiona Endpointb Weaponb u 
† 
ˆ s  
(95% CL)a 
† 
ˆ e  
(95% CL)a pe=0 
Other Casualty All 5 0.537              (0.506, 0.568) 
–0.119                    
(-0.154, -0.077) <10
-6 
Other Casualty All 5 
† 
ˆ a ! = 0.578            
(0.498, 0.665) 
† 
ˆ b  = –0.0014 
(-0.0042, 0.0011) 
–0.119                    
(-0.154, -0.077) <10
-6 
Israel Casualty All 5 1.03               (0.900, 1.19) 
–0.632                    
(-0.732, -0.534) ~0 
Other Death All 20 0.365              (0.314, 0.428) 0 0.59 
Other Death All 20 
† 
ˆ a ! = 0.463          
(0.291, 0.698) 
† 
ˆ b  = –0.0036 
(-0.011, 0.0026) 
0 0.75 
Israel Death All 10 0.241              (0.180, 0.334) 0 0.11 
Other Casualty Bombs 20 0.429             (0.386, 0.475) 
–0.112                    
(-0.165, -0.038) 0.0052 
Israel Casualty Bombs 5 1.12               (0.959, 1.31) 
–0.685                     
(-0.805, -574) ~0 
Other Casualty Guns 20 0.353              (0.272, 0.471) 0 0.32 
Israel Casualty Guns 5 1.34                (0.718, 2.02*) 
–0.937                    
(-1.43*, -0.320) 0.0055 
Other Deaths Bombs 10 0.373              (0.329, 0.425) 0 0.47 
Israel Deaths Bombs 10 0.232             (0.170, 0.328) 0 0.16 
Other Deaths Guns 20 0.340             (0.236, 0.518) 0 0.62 
Israel Deaths Guns 5 0.155             (0.071, 0.390) 0 0.034 
a Model fits were performed conditional on the specified value of the threshold parameter u of the 
generalized Pareto model (or corresponding trend model, indicated by parameters a and b), and if pe=0 > 
0.01 also on e = 0 (see Methods).  Other = all other worldwide regions besides Israel.  A pe=0 value < 10-15 
is indicated by ~0.  Confidence limit (CL) values listed were obtained by the profile likelihood method, or 
if that method failed to converge, by the delta method (indicated by *). 
b Events included were those during 1968-2004 that resulted in ≥1 case of the specified endpoint.  Bombs 
here includes remote-controlled bombs. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1.  Consequences of terrorist events during 5-y periods starting in 1968.  (A) Adverse 
terrorist events (AE); pre-1998 events are “international” (I) only, post-1997 events also include 
“domestic” events (I&D).  I-only data show a positive trend (solid line, R2 = 0.71, p = 0.035).  
The linear fit (dashed line) estimated from post-1997 data is conditional on the intercept (Xo 
ª1956) estimated from pre-1998 data.  The I&D slope is ~4.8 times greater than the I-only slope.  
(B) Adverse fraction (Fadv) of all events that occurred in:  Israel (®), Region 1 (l = Africa, Latin 
America, Near East [excluding Israel and the Occupied Territories], and South Asia), and all 
other regions combined (°).  Region 1 data show a positive trend (long-dashed line, R2 = 0.92, 
padj = 0.00055), while data for Israel (mean = 0.60, upper short-dashed line) and Region2 (mean 
= 0.27, lower short-dashed line) do not (padj > 0.80).  (C) Linear fits to pre-1998 data on 
casualties (bold line, R2 = 0.83, p = 0.012) and deaths (thin line, R2 = 0.75, p = 0.027) are shown, 
together with fits (dashed lines) corresponding to the two post-1997 data points for each endpoint 
conditional on Xo ª 1969 estimated from pre-1998 casualty data.  Dashed-to-solid slope ratios 
are both ~4.  (D)  Linear fits to data on (total victims)/(total events) ratios are shown for 
worldwide deaths (lower line, R2 = 0.87, p = 0.00079), and for worldwide casualties (upper line, 
R2 = 0.51, p = 0.046); the per event casualty-to-mortality slope ratio is ~4.2. 
Figure 2. (A)  Total victims/AE during 5-y periods starting in 1968.  Significant increasing 
trends are evident for deaths/AE (R2 = 0.51, p = 0.046) and for casualties/AE (R2 = 0.58, p = 
0.028).  (B) Casualty-weighted Ffat = (total deaths)/(total casualties in all AE) values for Israel 
(mean = 0.17, lower short-dashed line) vs. all other regions combined (mean = 0.33, upper short-
dashed line), the latter mean being significantly (~2-fold) greater (p = 0.0015).  Both groups 
show a common non-significant linear trend, with intercepts that differ significantly (p = 0.00095 
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by ANOCOVA F-test).  Unweighted Ffat values increased slightly from 1968-2004 in combined 
non-Israeli regions (long-dashed line, R2 = 0.69, p = 0.011), but not in Israel (p = 0.22).  (C) 
Casualty-weighted Ffat (solid points) by geographic region (“Near East” here excludes Israel and 
the Occupied Territories), where point diameter is proportional to total casualties over all 
periods.  For all regions except North America, the wj-weighted mean ± 2-tail 99% confidence 
limits for Ffat is 0.27 (long-dashed line) ± 0.14 (short-dashed lines).  The relatively high Ffat value 
for North America was due primarily to events on Sept. 11, 2001 (for which Ffat = 100%). 
Figure 3.  Period-specific cumulative relative-frequency distributions of the unweighted ratio Ffat 
of deaths to casualties per adverse event (AE), for all regions combined.  Distributions for 
successive periods are shown with solid curves of increasing thickness.  Later distributions 
increasingly shift downward and to the right relative to the starting 1968-72 distribution. 
Figure 4.  (Top) Ratio Ffat of total deaths to total casualties to the total number of adverse events 
(AE) during 1968-2004, plotted vs. corresponding casualties/AE rates, for gun- or bomb-related 
events that occurred in Israel vs. all other regions combined.  ANOCOVA-estimated intercepts 
for weapon-specific pairs of log-linear trends shown are significantly lower for Israel than for 
other combined regions, for events that involved either bombs (dashed lines, p = 0.029) or guns 
(solid lines, p = 0.000038).  (Bottom) Among events during 1968-2004 that caused ≥1 victim, 
the percent that involved guns is plotted vs. corresponding victims/event rates, for events that 
occurred in Israel vs. all other regions combined.  Israeli gun-related percents of fatal events are 
all ~10 to 20% lower than those in other regions; a similar difference for adverse events pertains 
only to those yielding < ~10 victims/event.  
Figure 5.  Cumulative relative frequency distributions of victims/event rates for all events 
causing ≥1 case during 1968-2004, in Israel vs. all other regions combined.  The empirical 
 34 
 
distributions shown differ significantly (by asymptotic Kolmogorov 2-sample test) for data on 
casualties (p ª 0) and for data on deaths (p  = 1.6 ¥ 10-5) 
Figure 6.  Equivalent lifetime (70-year) risks of casualty or death from terrorist events in Israel, 
the Occupied Territories, the Near East (excluding Israel and the Occupied Territories), and all 
other regions combined.  In the latter regional group, log-casualty risks show a significant 
positive trend (padj = 0.010) in log casualty risks over 1968-97 prior to inclusion of domestic 
events in RAND-MIPT data; no other temporal trends are evident (padj > 0.05). 
Figure 7  Lorenz curves for total deaths and total casualties due to terrorist events that caused ≥1 
victim during 1968-2004, in Israel vs. all other regions combined.  Light horizontal/vertical lines 
highlight 50% of total victims (horizontal), and events associated with 90th and 95th percentile 
victims/event rates (vertical).  The light solid and dashed curves at right, for example, show that 
~3% (and ~10%) of all adverse events outside (or inside) Israel caused ~50% of all deaths and of 
all casualties in those areas. 
Figure 8.  (Left) Generalized Pareto model fits to data on extreme values of victims per terrorist 
event leading to ≥1 case during 1968-2004, by endpoint (casualties or deaths) in Israel vs. all 
other regions.  (Right) Corresponding fits to data on bomb- vs. gun-induced casualties per 
adverse event during 1968-2004 in Israel vs. all other regions. 
Figure 9.  Generalized Pareto model fits from Figure 8 (left) with abscissa values re-expressed 
as expected year during 1980-2080 by which the indicated maximum victims/event rate has 
occurred, compared to corresponding empirical data during 1980-2004. 
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